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AUTHOR'S NOTE
Brent Madison made very helpful comments on a draft of this paper, as did audiences at
Soochow University, Australian Catholic University, and Cambridge University.
 
1. A Question
1 Western epistemology has long had a focus upon knowledge-that – knowledge of a truth
or  fact  –  when  discussing  knowledge  at  all.  Within  contemporary  epistemology  in
particular,  definitional  analyses  of  knowledge-that  have  abounded,  especially  since
Edmund Gettier’s  (1963)  philosophical  bee-sting.  He set  off  a  rash of  epistemological
agreement – allergy-like in its intensity and its speedy spread of the conviction that there
is more to knowing than having a true and well justified belief; and putative stories about
that ‘more’ have proliferated. In general,  though, even those post-Gettier attempts to
understand knowledge’s nature1 have not attempted to do so in terms of knowledge-how.
2 Perhaps the closest they have come to doing so2 has been within some versions of a virtue
epistemology. Ernest Sosa (e.g. 2007, 2011, 2015, 2016) has emphasized the potential role
of cognitive virtues within the production of an individual’s knowledge. These may be
regarded as  cognitive skills  on the part  of  the person –  skills  that  could in turn be
conceived of as instances of knowledge-how. Knowledge-how would thus be involved in
at least a person’s gaining some knowledge-that.
3 But  should we contemplate  an even stronger  link than that  causally  productive  one
between knowledge-how and knowledge-that? Might the knowing-how be literally a part
of  the  knowing-that,  even  after the  knowledge-that  has  been  produced  through  the
agency that is inherent in activating and applying the pertinent knowledge-how? That
metaphysically (not merely causally) constitutive possibility – about how knowledge-how
might be a vital part even of the nature of knowledge-that – is this paper’s concern.
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2. A Traditional Interpretation: Persisting Belief
4 We can ease into that discussion by asking about knowledge and belief. And initially we
can do this via an example. It describes a familiar sort of situation, involving an array of
cognitively charged actions. What might it indicate about knowledge, about belief, and
about any potentially constitutive relations between those two?
5 Imagine being asked whether you know that 58 + 68 = 126.  You reflect  for a moment,
consciously performing a simple calculation, before replying that, yes, you do have that
knowledge.  Are  you  thereby  committed  to  the  view  also  that  you  believe  that
58 + 68 = 126? You may well claim so. Yet what would be your evidence for those views of
yourself?
6 At this moment, when you actively ponder those two questions – Do you know? Do you
believe? – what you are most manifestly aware of are some actions on your part. You
notice  your  engaging in  some calculating.  You monitor  this  activity.  You might  feel
yourself accepting the result of that calculating. Then you give voice to – by asserting –
that result: ‘126. That’s the answer.’ You hear yourself giving that answer, perhaps as
anyone else hears your words, although maybe as only you could hear them.3
7 Yet where in all of this have you espied a belief – in the robust sense of a persisting or
continuing belief? Presumably, no such belief is identical with any of those actions by you.
Is  the belief  therefore something beyond or  behind these actions,  maybe underlying
them? You have no direct awareness of interacting with a belief like that. Indeed, you
cannot have such an awareness. For you cannot introspectively observe the persisting
existence of the belief beyond its being interacted with by you. Even if  somehow you
experience a content within yourself, you experience it only in its capacity as a content
present at that time of being experienced. Again,  where within this experience is the
persisting belief?
8 For that matter,  where – within all  of this – is your knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126? For
instance, is it wherever the belief is (wherever that is), due to knowledge’s always being a
kind of belief? Many would say so, in tune with the epistemologically entrenched view –
perhaps bequeathed to contemporary philosophy by Plato’s Meno (97e-98a) – that any
instance of knowledge is a kind of belief, an epistemically enriched belief. The belief (they
will say, in explaining that view) is the metaphysically describable ‘stuff’ or substance
that, once it is epistemically enriched, is the ‘thing’ that is the knowledge. The belief is the
‘thing’ in which the knowledge’s further required properties – those that are enriching
the belief epistemically,  properties such as being true and being epistemically justified –
‘inhere’  or to which they ‘attach.’  Accordingly,  is it  possible,  at  least  in principle,  to
describe your belief’s presence in this situation in advance of ascertaining whether you
also have the knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126?
9 Yet how would that happen (if indeed it can)? For example, could you find the belief
indirectly,  maybe  by  inference  from  some  of  your  self-observations  in  this  setting?
Various of your actions, such as the calculating, could be said to be generating the belief’s
presence. Other actions, such as your accepting or your asserting, would likely be taken
to be reflecting or arising from the belief’s presence. The presence of any or all of these
actions would supposedly either explain or be explained by the belief’s own presence. In
that spirit, should we say that the best explanation of these actions would mention the
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belief’s presence?4 Not only that; are such actions also best explained – in almost the same
breath – as somehow generating and/or reflecting or arising from your knowing that
58 + 68 = 126? If knowledge is always a form of belief, then these actions reflect the belief
that 58 + 68 = 126, for example, only if they also reflect – even if possibly not in quite the
same way – the knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126.
10 Still, is knowledge always a form of belief? For a start, not all of philosophy’s relevant
history  insists  that  it  is.  What,  indeed,  of  the  strongly  contrary  picture,  on  which
knowledge and belief are metaphysically disjoint, so that to know that p is not, even in
part, to believe that p? That contrary picture was also first painted for us by Plato, this
time in the Republic (475b-480). On this picture, belief and knowledge are taken to be so
deeply distinct in nature as to underlie the idiom, ‘No, I don’t believe it; I know it.’ And if
this disjointness thesis is correct, how should we interpret your actions, described in this
section,  as  indications  of  your  believing  –  or,  distinctly,  of  your  knowing  –  that
58 + 68 = 126?
11 § 9 will discuss this issue more fully, by attending to a recent argument – from Blake
Myers-Schulz  and  Eric  Schwitzgebel  (2013)  –  for  the  disjointness  thesis.  Until  then,
however, let us stay with the knowledge-as-a-kind-of-belief picture, given its being the
most widely accepted view among contemporary epistemologists as to what kind of thing
an instance of knowledge is.
 
3. An Alternative Interpretation: Inner Actions
12 The line of questioning introduced in § 2 might remind us of a famous argument by David
Hume (1978 [1739-40]: book I, part IV, sec. VI). I have in mind his objection to the thesis
that within each person there exists  an identifiable,  distinct,  and persisting personal
substance –  with its continuing existence being an essential explanatory element of a
person’s numerical identity over time. In presenting his argument, Hume conducted the
same sort of self-search as I asked you to perform a moment ago.
13 So, look within – for your self (asks Hume) or for your belief (this is my request). Seek that
privately persisting substance or that persisting belief. In neither case will you succeed:
all  that  you  will  clearly meet  are  experiences  occurring  at  that  time  of  their  being
uncovered by your inner investigation. And whatever else, if anything, these are at a
moment of being met by your inner explorations, you can meet such an experience only
in its capacity as something itself active, something happening and alive.
14 An experience can have a content adverting to more than this moment. And often you
may feel that you are meeting within you a persisting attitude to that content. But that
feeling could be misleading. What you meet at that moment is an attitude present at least
at that time; and you do not thereby meet something present at another time. Even if the
attitude you meet has a content that you feel yourself to be accepting also for other times,
you are not meeting it while it is functioning as an object of acceptance at other times. As
Hume says (1978: 252):
when I  enter most intimately into what I  call  myself,  I  always stumble on some
particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain
or pleasure. I never can catch myself at any time without a perception, and never
can observe any thing but the perception. When my perceptions are remov’d for
any time, as by sound sleep; so long am I insensible of myself, and may truly be said
not to exist.
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15 Is  that  merely  a  Humean  eccentricity?  Far  from  it;  the  similarity  of  this  Humean
reasoning to Descartes’ Cogito, no less, is striking. In perhaps modern Western
philosophy’s most famous reasoning, Descartes reassured himself that, so long as he was
thinking (even if only by doubting), he knew himself to exist – but only as that active
thinking. He could not know himself within that setting – ‘Meditation II’ – as a persisting
and  independently  existing  substance,  even  when  restricting  his  known  features  to
mental ones. And with this assessment of what he can know and what he cannot know,
Descartes claimed to answer his metaphysically foundational question, ‘But what then am
I?’ (1984 [1641]: 18, 19, 22):
I am, I exist – that is certain. But for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it
could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist.
[…] But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts,
understands,  affirms,  denies,  is  willing,  is  unwilling,  and also  imagines  and has
sensory perceptions.
[…] But what am I to say about this mind, or about myself? (So far, remember, I am
not admitting that there is anything else in me except a mind.)
16 And so far I am saying something similar about your inner experienced self as a knower.
You cannot  ever  know that  you are  finding within you (at  least  by introspection)  a
persisting and independently existing epistemic substance – such as a continuing state of
belief – able to be the metaphysical ‘stuff’ of your knowing that 58 + 68 = 126.5 Only inner
actions –  cognitive  ones  –  existing  at  the  time  of  the  introspective  search  will  be
knowingly encountered. Yet this should not be surprising. Only by acting could you know,
as a result of effort at that time, something present within you at that same time. Such
acting cannot know that it has found anything inner beyond something existing as an
object of such acting. (Some acting is being known, we may suppose. And in order to
know something inner and beyond that acting, one has to continue one’s inner acting;
with which effort, you continue meeting only what is thereby, at any such moment, not
existing at any further moment.)
 
4. Knowledge-that as Knowledge-how
17 Is that a worrying picture? Does it confront us with a reason never to regard ourselves as
believers, or even as knowers?
18 Not if we are prepared to make some correlative conceptual adjustments. Specifically, we
can respond to that line of thought about knowledge somewhat as Hume responded to his
own about persons. He proposed a reconception of the fundamental nature of personal
identity.  What  is a  person?  Hume’s  answer  was  that  each  of  us  is  a  republic or
commonwealth of experiences (1978: 261), a bundle of ideas and impressions (1978: 252).
What persists as a person’s persisting is the bundle as such – not necessarily its particular
members,  and  not  a  further  inner  substance  underlying  and binding  together  those
phenomena. Might an analogous picture illuminate the relationship between a person’s
persisting knowledge,  such as her knowing that 58 + 68 = 126, and her related cognitive
actions (such as calculating, accepting, and asserting)? This possibility merits attention.6
19 First, let me describe it a little less schematically.
20 Let  those  cognitive  actions  –  your  calculating,  your  accepting,  your  asserting  –  be
expressions or manifestations, in their different ways, of your knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126.
But  let  them be  expressing  or  manifesting  this  knowledge,  precisely  as  actions  can
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express  or  manifest  knowledge-how.7 For  now,  we  may  think  of  this  as  the  actions
expressing or manifesting associated abilities or skills.8 (Thus, you would be calculating
aptly as an expression of your knowing how to do so. The same would be true of the
subsequent actions of your accepting, and your asserting, that 58 + 68 = 126.) Finally, we
may also propose or hypothesize that this knowledge-how – this collection of skills –
would be your knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126. To describe the knowledge-how would be to
describe all that there is in having the knowledge-that.
21 Notice how the relationship being described as obtaining between your actions and your
knowledge-how is metaphysically constitutive. Your cognitive actions, in being the actions
they  are,  express  or  manifest  those  attendant  abilities  or  skills,  the  accompanying
knowledge-how. Their nature as those actions is to be such expressions or manifestations.
They are not merely caused by your having the associated knowledge-how.
22 Notice also how a single case of knowledge-how can encompass several – maybe many –
distinct kinds of action: knowing-how can be multi-twined in that way. It is a picture with
a  Peircean  tenor.  Think  of  C. S. Peirce’s  (1931-58:  vol. V,  para. 265)  conception  of
evidential support:
Philosophy ought to imitate  the successful  sciences  in  its  methods,  so far  as  to
proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny,
and  to  trust  rather  to  the  multitude  and  variety  of  its  arguments  than  to  the
conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no
stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibers may be ever so slender,
provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.9
23 Your  calculating,  your  accepting,  your  asserting:  these  are  actions  expressing  or
manifesting your knowing that 58 + 68 = 126. Equally, they are ways of expressing some or
all of whatever skills are jointly constituting a commonwealth or bundle of your associated
abilities.  That  commonwealth  or  bundle  may  then  be  regarded  as  some  complex
knowledge-how: you have some specific knowledge insofar as you have some pertinent
abilities, each of which is such that an action expressing or manifesting it is thereby an
expression or manifestation of knowing.
24 And so we have this explanatory hypothesis:
Actions that seem to reflect knowledge-that are expressions of knowledge-how; and
to note this is to explain all that would be explained in positing the knowledge-that.
Hence, if we insist on knowledge-that’s being present, we are free to regard the
knowledge-that as the knowledge-how. In short, knowledge-that is knowledge-how
and nothing else.
 
5. The Order-of-Explanation Objection and
Intellectualism
25 But is that proposed order of explanation actually the reverse of what it should be? The
objection generating this question would insist  (as follows) that the knowledge-that’s
presence explains the knowledge-how’s presence; and not vice versa:
You know how to reach, accept, and assert ‘126’ as an answer to our mathematical
question (and hence, other things being equal, you do provide this answer) in a way
that  is  recognizably  knowledgeable  –  only  in  part  because,  independently  and
already, you know that 58 + 68 = 126. You can perform those actions – calculating,
accepting, asserting – as expressions or manifestations of the knowledge-how, only
because you  have  the  knowledge-that.  Those  skills  –  your  abilities  to  calculate,
Knowledge as Potential for Action
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
5
accept, and assert in this circumstance – are means only of putting into effect your
knowledge-that. The knowledge-how that enters this simple story amounts only to
being your knowing how to manifest  or  give expression to what  is  already and
independently your knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126.
26 This is the order-of-explanation objection. It bespeaks what is for many people a natural
conception of  how knowledge and action coalesce.  The objection gives voice to what
Gilbert Ryle (1949, 1971) called intellectualism. It was Ryle who brought to epistemology’s
attention the potential  categorial  difference between knowledge-that and knowledge-
how – their  being irreconcilably different  kinds of  knowledge.  Whether  there is  that
metaphysically deep difference between them depends upon whether intellectualism is
true. Like Ryle, I say that intellectualism is false – demonstrably false.
27 Intellectualism  concerns  what  Ryle  called  intelligent actions  –  what  we  have  been
referring to as exemplifications or manifestations of knowledge-how; what Jason Stanley
(2011) calls skilful actions. How do these come to exist as actions with this epistemic
character?  According  to  intellectualism,  they  are  guided  into  existence  by  some
knowledge-that, perhaps regulative knowledge-that describing a method or technique.
So,  go  ahead:  climb aboard that  bicycle.  Then start  riding.  In  doing  so,  you will  be
applying your knowledge that B – for some proposition B describing enough of what
would suffice for successfully riding a bicycle. You will be putting into practice some
practical knowledge – your knowledge how to ride a bicycle. But intellectualism claims
that you can do this only in part through possessing, and being guided by, some already-
present and independently constituted propositional or theoretical knowledge – in this
case, your knowledge that B.
28 Nonetheless, here is one way in which, by taking our cue from Ryle, we might argue
against any such intellectualist picture.
29 The intellectualist hears of your riding the bicycle skilfully. She infers that you must have
applied  some knowledge-that,  such  as  the  knowledge  that  B.  But  your  applying  the
knowledge  that  B  is  itself  a  further  intelligent  action.  (Although  it  is  perhaps  not
consciously  applied,  it  is  at  least  reliably  directed.  And  it  is  relevantly  different  to
digesting,  which  is  also  reliably  directed  yet  which  you  never  learnt,  for  example.)
Somehow, you skilfully apply your knowledge that B. However, this will likewise attract
the intellectualist’s attention: she must posit a further piece of knowledge – this time,
your knowledge that B1 – as being applied by you. B1 is knowledge of some means of
applying your knowledge that B (your knowledge of a way of riding a bicycle). Can the
intellectualist’s analysis end there? Not if this further knowledge has also been applied
skilfully.  And surely it  has;  in which case,  intellectualism requires  you to have been
applying yet another piece of knowledge – call it knowledge that B2. As before, this new
knowledge will be guiding into action the previously hypothesized knowledge – this time,
the knowledge that B1. And so on: in turn, you will be required to have known that B3, to
have known that B4,  etc. More and more knowledge is thus being expected from you,
unendingly and impossibly, even to explain just a single intelligent action on your part.
For Ryle, the reason for this unwelcome result was evident: namely, intellectualism is
false.
30 In what follows, I will assume for argument’s sake that Ryle was right about this – because
he might  well  have been,  and because I  am asking what  conceptual  possibilities  are
realistic if he was right. If he was, then the following possibility is available as we try to
understand how knowledge and action intermingle:
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There can be intelligent actions – ones manifesting or expressing knowledge-how –
that need not have been guided into existence by knowledge-that.
31 This implies that it is possible for at least some knowledge-how not to include knowledge-
that within itself. If in each case knowledge-that was to be part of the knowledge-how,
then  manifesting  the  knowledge-how  would  include  manifesting  the  contained
knowledge-that. But Ryle’s form of reasoning implies that it is possible for an intelligent




32 I am hypothesizing that all knowledge-that is knowledge-how, not that all knowledge-
how  is  knowledge-that.  Accordingly,  not  all  intelligent  actions  –  even  though  they
express or manifest knowledge-how – express or manifest knowledge-that. Still, we must
face the question of whether all knowing actions (as I call them) do so.
33 Knowing actions encompass such actions as those that we imagined you performing in
response  to  the  question,  ‘What  is 58 + 68?’  –  your  calculating,  your accepting,  your
asserting.  Any  knowing  action  has  an  apparent point  of  manifesting  or  expressing
knowledge.  We may parse this  as  the knowing action’s  point  being that of  conveying
knowledge. Riding a bicycle, for example, is an intelligent action without being a knowing
action. In contrast, answering the question ‘What is 58 + 68?’ with ‘126’ does occur with
the aim of conveying knowledge. Hence, it is a knowing action.10
34 Nonetheless, knowing actions remain a kind of intelligent action (in Ryle’s sense of the
latter). So, at this stage of our thinking, we have no reason not to apply Ryle’s general
anti-intellectualist argument to them. Courtesy of Ryle, therefore, we may infer this:
Even when knowledge-how is being manifested by a knowing action, this need not
be occurring because of some knowledge-that’s guidance. (Yes, a knowing action
typically has a point of conveying knowledge. Even this does not entail knowledge-
that’s also guiding the action.) In which case, equally, the knowing action need not
be occurring under the guiding influence of some knowledge-that’s presence. (For
according to intellectualism, the pertinent point of the knowledge-that’s presence
would  be  precisely  to  provide  such  guidance.  If  –  as  is  shown  by  Ryle’s  anti-
intellectualism argument – guidance by knowledge-that is not needed, then neither
is the presence of knowledge-that.)
35 Correlatively,  too,  we  need  not  posit  the  existence  of  some  knowledge-that  as
accompanying the knowing action. Doing so would be explanatorily idle. I am not saying
that no knowledge-that could be present.  But there need not be any,  even given the
occurrence of knowing actions. The latter actions can be knowing ones, given simply some
accompanying knowledge-how.
 
7. Knowledge in Action
36 Yet § 6’s picture of how we can act knowingly could well sound implausible, along the
following lines:
Maybe Ryle was right to deny that an intelligent action such as riding a bicycle
must be accompanied, let alone guided, by some knowledge-that. Surely, however,
when the intelligent action is also a knowing action in particular – such as your
asserting an answer of ‘126’ to the question, ‘What is 58 + 68?’ – knowledge-that
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does need to be present, playing some causal role in the knowing action’s coming
into existence.
37 Not only that (continues the objection); presumably some epistemologists will object that
if no knowledge-that is present then the actions are knowing ones only in a distressingly
weak way. These would be knowing actions only in the sense of being intended to convey
knowledge.
38 But  that  objection  begs  the  central  question  to  which  my  proposal  is  offering  an
alternative answer. That answer begins by clarifying Ryle’s result, as follows.
39 What he showed (when his point is formulated more precisely) is that intelligent actions
are not guided into existence by some categorially distinct knowledge-that. Nor, therefore
(I infer), are knowing actions. And the significance of that added precision is its revealing
how  we  have  conceptual  room  for  interpreting  such  actions  (intelligent  actions  in
general; knowing actions in particular) as able to exist as expressions or manifestations of
knowledge-how – and thereby of  knowledge-that.  The knowledge-that would now not be
categorially distinct from knowledge-how. So,  we may say that,  whenever a knowing
action  occurs,  there  is knowledge  accompanying  it.  However,  this  knowledge  is  the
knowledge-how that is being manifested or expressed by the knowing action.
40 And we can distinguish these cases of knowledge-how – the ones that are knowledge-that
– from other cases of knowledge-how. We do this, not categorially, but by attending to the
content of the respective intelligent actions that would be expressions or manifestations
of the knowledge-how in question. Your knowledge that 58 + 68 = 126 is a complex of
abilities, each of which aims at conveying a truth. Your knowledge how to ride a bicycle is
a complex of abilities, probably none of which aims at conveying a truth.
41 Knowing  actions  are  thus  instances  of  knowledge  in action.  Each  such  action  is  an
instance  of  knowledge  activated –  knowledge  being activated.  In  general,  though,
knowledge-how can exist even when it is not activated. After all, abilities need not be
manifested – put into action – in order to exist.11 And this is as it should be: much of your
knowledge does not disappear when you sleep, even when all of your manifestations of
that knowledge – the knowing actions distinctive of the knowledge in question – do so.12
So knowledge is inactive or unactivated other than when knowing actions are expressing
or manifesting it.  Then it  is  activated,  at  least  for  a  while.  Your accepting the right
answer; your uttering the right answer: each of these is your putting into action the




42 We have focused upon a case of mathematical knowledge. How does my account apply to
perceptual knowledge?
43 Elegantly so. Imagine being outside a field, looking at what seems to be a barn; as indeed
it is. So you think to yourself that it is a barn. You do not also consciously note its roof
being red. Nevertheless, you can know that the barn’s roof is red, by having pertinent
abilities. Are you able to picture, if asked, the colour of the barn’s roof? Are you able, if
asked, to describe that colour? If you have one or both of those abilities, you have the
knowledge – even if you are never asked those questions.
Knowledge as Potential for Action
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
8
44 However, this knowledge could remain inactive if those questions are never posed. In that
sense, the knowledge – by being knowledge-how – is a potentiality within you. It is your
having a potential for many knowing actions, both inner ones and outer ones. It is a
potential for answering questions and/or for forming questions and/or for consciously
describing an aspect of the surroundings and/or for drawing that aspect and/or etc. If the
knowledge was to be activated (such as if you were to be asked about the roof’s colour),
you might proceed to have a consciously held experience of believing about the roof’s
colour.  Even so,  this  would  not  be your  knowledge  of  the  roof’s  colour.  Your  inner
experience – even if it feels to you like it is the mere ‘tip’ of an inner persisting belief –
would  instead be  only  a  manifestation or  expression of  the  perceptual  knowledge,  the
perceptual knowledge-how.
 
9. Knowledge and Belief
45 I  have  been  outlining  how  we  might  begin  to  conceive  of  all  knowledge  as  being
knowledge-how. The idea has been that, in general, any instance of knowledge that p is a
complex instance of knowledge-how – complex in the range and number of specific skills
or abilities that are somehow bundled together within it, each of them bearing relevantly
upon p. That idea should now be tested by our trying to answer the question – mentioned
in § 2 – of where belief fits into this picture of knowledge.
46 The  question  is  pressing  because  many  philosophers  would  say  that  the  complex
potentiality that, on my view, is the given instance of knowledge is present only because,
in turn, knowledge is a kind of belief. More fully, the potentiality that, I have suggested, is
part of an instance of knowing is actually part of the belief that is (by being suitably
embellished) the instance of knowledge. And if so, there is no motivation to conceive of
knowledge in practicalist terms. Rather (say those epistemologists), we could rest content
with a traditional view simply of belief – as a required element within knowledge – as a
dispositional state: that is, if confronted by a pertinent circumstance (such as one’s being
asked whether it is true that p), one would respond in a p-affirming or p-reflecting way.14
Such an action could be an intelligent action, in Ryle’s sense. It could also be a knowing
action, in my sense. Is a dispositional conception of belief therefore already adequate for
capturing the potentialities that I have described as constituting knowledge (and thus as
motivating a move to a knowledge-practicalism)? If it is, then maybe knowledge could
still  be  thought  of  in  more  traditional  terms,  as  being  a  form  of  belief  (albeit  an
epistemically blessed or augmented form). Consequently, we would not need to reach – in
the  less  traditional  way  that  I  have  been  advocating  –  for  a  practicalism  about
knowledge’s nature.
47 I grant that a belief-manifesting action, say, can also be a knowing action. Hence, I also
grant, at least some of the dispositionality within believing could be at least part of the
potentiality within a given instance of knowing. But this does not entail that the former
dispositionality ever – let alone always – exhausts the latter potentiality. After all, there is
an alternative explanation of this apparent overlap of potentialities – one that preserves a
knowledge-practicalism. This alternative explanation also offers us a middle way between
the Republic-Platonic disjointness thesis – whereby to believe that p is to not know that p,
and to know that p is to not believe that p – and the Meno-Platonic tradition – whereby
any instance of knowledge is at least a true opinion or true belief, bolstered by a logos (an
account, an understanding).
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48 Ryle is suggestive here (1949: 133-4):15
‘Know’ is a capacity verb, and a capacity verb of that special sort that is used for
signifying  that  the  person  described  can  bring  things  off,  or  get  things  right.
‘Believe’, on the other hand, is a tendency verb and one which does not connote
that anything is brought off or got right. […]
Roughly, ‘believe’ is of the same family as motive words, where ‘know’ is of the
same family as skill  words; so we ask how a person knows this,  but only why a
person believes that […] Skills have methods, where habits and inclinations have
sources. Similarly, we ask what makes people believe or dread things but not what
makes them know or achieve things.
49 Ryle thus emphasizes a standard sense in which knowledge strengthens belief. One has a
success-relationship to a fact that p in knowing that p, a relationship that one need not
have in believing that p: knowledge is always factive, while belief is not.
50 Nonetheless,  Ryle  overlooks  a  sense  –  a  practicalist  one  –  in  which  the  converse
strengthening relation can obtain: believing can strengthen knowing. Specifically, when
one both knows and believes that p, the belief, even if dispositionally so, opens up some
possible ways of using the knowledge. By having a belief that p, I suggest, one is able –
indeed,  one  could  be  well able  –  to  perform  various  actions  that  (i)  can  also  be
manifestations or expressions of the knowledge that p, (ii) do not exhaust the range of
possible manifestations or expressions of the knowledge, and (iii) could be unavailable to
one in the absence of the belief.
51 In support  of  that  picture,  we may consider the cases  with which Myers-Schulz  and
Schwitzgebel (2013: 374-7) have argued that there can be instances of knowledge without
an accompanying belief. Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel offer five cases (‘the unconfident
examinee,’ ‘the absent-minded driver,’ ‘the prejudiced professor,’ ‘the freaked-out movie-
watcher,’ ‘the self-deceived husband’) – using these cases as experimental philosophers
would. But we can also use the cases a priori, while engaging with this question: ‘Is there
something missing from what the knowledge could be, insofar as the knowledge is present yet
the belief is not?’ 
52 The first case will suffice here. It is an adaptation of Colin Radford’s (1966) oft-cited case.
Myers-Shulz and Schwitzgebel imagine someone, Kate, being asked, in an exam, ‘In what
year did Queen Elizabeth I die?’ Kate has studied for the exam; but this question arises for
her only when the exam period has almost expired – as the teacher announces. Hearing
the announcement, Kate panics, tries to recall the answer, fails – and writes, albeit with
no confidence,  the  correct  answer.  Is  that  answer  knowledge  on Kate’s  part?  Is  she
lacking belief (in the correctness of her answer) at that moment? A significant proportion
of respondents surveyed by Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel attributed knowledge but not
belief to Kate; as would I. For the sake of argument, therefore, I will accept that Kate has
knowledge – not belief, though – as to Queen Elizabeth’s dying in 1603.
53 And what does Kate – as that knower – lose by not having that belief? In particular, does
she lose anything relevantly epistemic? Indeed she does. For example, deprived of the
belief  in  the  way  described  by  Myers-Schulz  and  Schwitzgebel,  she  would  lack  the
confidence to express consciously the knowledge, at least in many situations. Seemingly,
she would qualify or weaken her answer of ‘1603’ if that action was available to her. And,
if not for being forced by the exam’s strictures to provide an answer, she might well have
opted not to do so. Clearly, there is a respect in which, by lacking the belief in this way,
Kate lacks some meta-knowledge: she does not know that she knows the year of Queen
Elizabeth’s death, even though she does (I am assuming) have the latter knowledge, the
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knowledge directly about Queen Elizabeth. And the lack of that meta-knowledge, given its
both reflecting and expressing itself  for her in a conscious lack of confidence in her
having the knowledge about Queen Elizabeth, will itself affect her ability to respond aptly
in various circumstances where the latter knowledge is being investigated or sought. So,
the lack of belief – as manifested in Kate’s lack of conscious confidence – does weaken her
epistemically in this setting. Even if it does not deprive her of the underlying knowledge,
it could deprive her of at least some knowing actions, ones that would – by expressing the
belief – express or manifest the knowledge. It thereby weakens the knowledge’s power for
her, at least in practise. Again, though, this is not to say that the knowledge is absent:
there are still knowing actions that she will perform (such as providing, if forced, the
correct answer in the exam). But there are others that she will not perform.
54 My practicalist suggestion, then, is that, insofar as knowledge that p is present without
belief that p, a person can do less of what would count as manifesting or expressing the
knowledge. In not believing that p, she loses the ability – the capacity – to perform, in at
least some ways in at least some situations, actions that would be natural expressions or
manifestations of the knowledge that p. Nonetheless, this remains consistent with her
having enough other abilities that suffice for her having the knowledge. To believe is thus
to have an ability, perhaps dispositional in nature, that can be present as part of having
some knowledge – even if its being so is not essential for the knowledge’s being present.
Other  things  being  equal,  a  given  instance  of  knowledge’s  potential  for  producing
knowing actions can be strengthened by including a belief among the sub-abilities that
happen  to  jointly  constitute  it  as  being  the  complex  potentiality  that it  is.  Yet  the
knowledge that p’s being stronger in this way than it might have been is not essential to
its  mere  presence;  what  it  is  essential  to  is  knowledge’s  having  a specific  epistemic
strength as knowledge that p. It is not essential to the complex potentiality’s being strong
enough (however strong that is)16 simply to be present as knowledge that p.
 
10. The State of Knowing
55 Implicit in this paper’s practicalism is a metaphysics of knowing, one element of which is
the following.
56 Insofar as all knowing is knowledge-how, we are free to maintain a view of knowing –
and, for that matter, of believing – as a state.17 That is a traditional picture, as far as it
goes. But not everyone would accept it. §1 mentioned Ernest Sosa’s recent attempts to
develop a virtue-theoretic conception of knowledge. On that conception, both knowledge
and  belief  are  kinds  of  epistemic  performance.18 If  such  a  conception  succeeds,  then
epistemic norms – of behaviour, of action – are applicable; which is indeed what Sosa
deems  to  be  the  case.  Such  a  conception  goes  further  in  that  direction  than  my
practicalism does, in that it treats knowledge, say, as an action, whereas I treat knowledge
only as potential for actions.
57 I take heart, then, from the linguistic data’s being against Sosa in this respect. Matthew
Chrisman (2012: 601) explains:
The basic result is that belief and knowledge attributions seem, by virtue of their
meaning, to be about something nondynamic, whereas paradigmatic performance
descriptions (for  example,  of  arrow shootings  [an example used often by Sosa])
seem to be about something dynamic and so nonstative. I  think this shows that
Sosa’s  suggestion that  belief  is  a  performance  –  which  when  successful  (true)
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because skillful (justified) is apt and so a kind of knowledge – involves him in a sort
of metaphysical category mistake in the way he uses these words.
58 Again, on my picture believing and knowing are states. A belief that p, when present as
part of some knowledge that p, brings with it various possibilities for action; and some of
these (as we saw in §9) are possible actions that knowledge-without-belief would not
ground.  So,  a  belief-state  can  enrich a  knowledge-state.  It  is  not  a  mere  part of  a
knowledge-state: to believe is to have more possible actions – specifically, further knowing
actions – available to one, other things being equal.
59 Nevertheless, I am saying that, even when a person does both know that p and believe
that p, the knowledge is not itself the belief. The contrary tradition – the Meno-Platonic one
–  tells  us  that  knowledge  is a  belief,  so  long as  the  belief  has  various  epistemically
welcome features. Proponents of that tradition are using, in effect, a substance-attribute
model of what knowledge is. They are treating the belief as needing to be present, and as
amounting to some ‘metaphysical  unit’  that  is  the knowledge,  so long as  it  also has
various epistemically pertinent features, such as being supported by good evidence. I am
arguing,  however,  that  this  traditional  metaphysical  picture is  optional  at  best.  I  am
offering instead a potentialities model of knowledge. On this model, all that constitutes the
knowing is  the  person’s  potential,  however  this  is  realised  or  grounded, for  various
suitably related actions.19 I  have explained that these actions may be conceived of as
knowing actions:  like  other  Rylean  intelligent  actions,  they  are  manifestations  or
expressions  of  the  knowledge,  given  its  being  knowledge-how;  unlike  some  Rylean
intelligent actions, though (such as riding a bicycle), these are ones whose point is at least
to convey or express the knowledge.
60 These  knowing  actions  can  be  useful,  in  turn,  for  further  ends.  But  in  all  such
circumstances  this  is  because the  actions  express  knowledge.  C. I. Lewis’s  words  are
apposite here (1946: 3):
The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action:
knowing is for the sake of doing. […] [O]nly an active being could have knowledge
[…] A creature which did not enter into the process of reality to alter in some part
the future content of it, could apprehend a world only in the sense of intuitive or
esthetic contemplation; and such contemplation would not possess the significance
of knowledge but only that of enjoying and suffering.
61 I concur; and I extend Lewis’s pragmatist point. His pragmatism is not as far-reaching as
it  could  be,  in  that  he  retains  the  Meno-Platonic  structuring –  what  contemporary
epistemologists usually call the conceptual analysis – of knowledge. He tells us (1946: 9)
that knowledge is ‘an assertive state of mind’: that is, knowledge is at least a belief, of
some or other form. Surrounding this, he holds in place the standard substance-attribute
model that I described above. He says (ibid.) this: ‘Knowledge is belief which not only is
true but also is justified in its believing attitude.’ In contrast, I say, knowledge is only a
potential that can include whatever potential is inherent in believing; knowledge is not
automatically in part an instance of believing.
 
11. Truth in Action
62 If we are to conceive of knowledge-that as a kind of knowledge-how, it is imperative that
we answer this question:
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How  radical a  reconception  of  knowledge  is  being  contemplated?  Which  of
knowledge’s  constitutive  properties  (as  these  have  formerly  been  envisaged  by
epistemologists) will stay? Which will depart?
63 I have already argued that belief – persisting belief – is not essential within knowledge. (I
have hypothesized that knowledge is knowledge-how, having argued that knowledge need
not include a persisting belief.) What now of truth? Where is it to be located within this
alternative picture – what I have elsewhere (e.g. 2011a) called a practicalism about the
nature of knowledge-that?
64 Certainly  we  expect knowledge  to  incorporate  truth.  But  this  requirement  must  be
formulated carefully. Suppose we say that part of your knowing that 58 + 68 = 126 is its
being true that 58 + 68 = 126. Well, it remains true that 58 + 68 = 126, regardless of what it is
to know this truth. So, that formulation was not quite correct. The question is one of how
the specific truth is to be part of the knowledge – included in the knowledge – rather than
of how the truth is to obtain regardless of the knowledge’s nature. Traditional accounts of
knowledge say that knowledge includes truth because knowledge includes a belief (or
something similar)  and because this belief’s  content is  true.  How will  my practicalist
analysis replace that supposed explanation? On my picture, what within the person is true
(if not necessarily a belief)? I have not said that believing is never present within a case of
knowledge. I have denied only that it always need be present: believing is just one of the
possible ways of manifesting or expressing the knowledge in question.20 When believing is
present, it could be true – making the knowledge true – in the usual way. Nonetheless,
that is  not an adequate explanation,  on my conception of  knowledge.  I  need a more
general account of truth’s presence, covering also the other possible manifestations or
expressions of the knowledge-how that is the knowledge-that.
65 Accordingly, I welcome Richard Campbell’s (2011) discussion of the concept of truth. His
key  contention is  that  we  need not  restrict  ourselves  to  what  he  calls  the  linguistic
conception  of  truth  (ibid.:  ch.  2);  for  that  is  not  the  most  fundamental  or  general
conception of truth. A traditionally motivated focus upon belief-contents as the only way
in  which  truth  can  be  part  of  knowledge  would  reflect  only  that  more  restrictive
conception of truth. Campbell argues (ibid.: chs. 4, 5) that we may think of truth first and
foremost as a feature of actions (and only derivatively as a feature of believings, say).
Reflect on how readily we do speak of an action’s being true. Let us take such talk literally,
by saying that an action is true when it is reliable or faithful. (For example, a kick can be
true, as can a swimming stroke – in each case, pure and clean and effective and thus what
it should ideally be, other things being equal.) We may then extend that insight. A true
friend, for instance, is likewise reliable and faithful (ibid.: 104). She can be relied upon in
her actions, or she will be faithful in her actions – all of this, given her character (ibid.:
110-1). We thus begin to understand how truth can be a property of actions and even of
their agents. An action is true insofar as it treats – rather than represents – things as they
are (ibid.: 123).
66 We  may  thereby  speak  similarly  of  your  knowledge-how  –  including  the  particular
knowledge-how that is your knowing that 58 + 68 = 126 – being reliable and faithful. This
will be part of your being reliable and faithful in relevant respects. You can be relied upon,
and you will be faithful, in how you act when in relevant situations – all of this, when you
are asked related questions, when you undertake to think about them, when you offer
answers, etc. Such actions – including knowing actions – by you will thus be true. Hence,
this knowledge-how of yours can incorporate truth. It would be true as a friend is true. It
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would be true in a ‘larger’ way. More technically: it would be true in a supervaluational
way, by at least most21 of its actual or possible manifestations – the knowing actions
expressing it – being true. These would be true by treating the world aptly. And all of this
is so, on any of the more specific ways in which the knowledge-how could be expressed or
manifested by a knowing action.22
 
12. Conclusion
67 Arguments  by  Hume,  Descartes,  Ryle,  and  Peirce  helped  to  motivate  this  paper’s
reasoning. I will close with another pattern of welcome historical resonance.
68 Berkeley’s  idealism  about  physical  matter  is  surprisingly  relevant.  He  faced  the
conceptual challenge of accounting for the nature of unobserved physical matter. How
does a tree in the quadrangle continue to exist once no one observes it? We are aware of
Berkeley’s answer: God observes the tree even when none of us does so.23 We are also
aware  of  John  Stuart  Mill’s  phenomenalist  attempt  to  preserve  Berkeley’s  idealist
emphasis upon acts of perceiving, without relying on any Berkeleian talk of God. This was
Mill’s suggestion (1979 [1865]: 183): ‘Matter may be defined, a Permanent Possibility of
Sensation.’  Matter  thus has a  modal  dimension – this  inescapable sort  of  permanent
possibility. That dimension constitutes the physical object’s persistence, when the object
is not being perceived.
69 I regard knowledge in similar terms. I have been advocating an analogue of a Millian
phenomenalism –  mine  is  about  knowledge-that  as  knowledge-how  –  built  upon  an
analogue  of  a  Humean  bundling  –  mine  is  of  manifestations  or  expressions  of  the
knowledge-how  that  is  the  knowledge-that. That  combination  has  generated  the
following picture.
70 Whenever you have a particular piece of knowledge-that, there are various actual and/or
possible knowing actions standing to your knowledge much as various actual  and/or
possible perceptual experiences stand to an object’s physicality. The knowledge is partly
potential – a permanent possibility of being manifested or expressed. The knowledge is
thus modal in its metaphysics, even if not its content; for it is knowledge-how; which is a
more  or  less  complex  skill  or  ability;  which  will  or  can  typically  be  manifested  or
expressed by various knowing actions;  but  which also might  never be manifested or
expressed. Still, when those actions do occur, they amount to the knowledge in action –
that is, to activated knowledge. There need not be anything beyond those actions, uniting
them,  other  than the  particular  knowledge-how  to produce them  –  that  particular
potential for such performances. This is what knowledge is; or so I am proposing.
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NOTES
1. For overviews of these attempts, see Shope 1983, Lycan 2006, and Hetherington 2016a.
2. Apart, that is, from Stanley & Williamson 2001 and those epistemologists responding to them.
Stanley and Williamson’s aim was to understand knowledge-how as knowledge-that. (See also
Stanley 2011.) §8 will discuss that issue.
3. Here, I am thinking of Anscombe’s account (1963) of one’s knowledge of one’s own intentional
actions: perhaps only you know qua intentional action what you are asserting. (Of course, you
might have uttered your words inwardly, too, perhaps rehearsing before giving them a public
performance. That would be a distinct way in which only you would know of your words.)
4. And could one use that sort of explanation in a special way, in crediting oneself with having a
continuing  belief?  I  have  two  responses  to  that  question.  (1)  Such  a  way  of  reaching  an
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attribution of persisting belief to oneself is an onlooker’s way, an external way. It bespeaks no
pre-theoretical hint of privileged access. It could not be one’s knowing of one’s inner belief in a
way that is possible only for oneself. (2) If we are restricted to such onlooker’s knowledge of our
persisting beliefs, we have a perspective from which the alternative account proposed in this
paper is even better supported. I will be talking of a person’s ability to do this or that. Such an
account (i)  can accommodate the same data as would be explained by talking of a persisting
belief,  and  (ii)  fortunately  has  no  pretension  –  unlike  beliefs  –  to  being  able  to  be  known
introspectively.
5. I mention introspection here because it was what Hume and Descartes were using.
6. Here is a possibly significant aspect of it upon which I will not dwell (partly because it arises as
a general question about Hume’s picture):How could one know introspectively that there is a
bundle present at all, since one does not introspect the bundle’s limits or boundaries?
I have two tentative suggestions. You could observe (i) some bundling, if memory is available to
you when you are introspecting, and/or (ii) a bundle as it is present so far, even if perhaps not
thereby what might be the completed or final bundle.
7. Stanley  (2011)  talks  at  times  of  various  actions  as  manifesting  some  knowledge- that.  But
actions  more  clearly  manifest  knowledge-how  than  knowledge-that,  since  knowledge-how  is
knowledge how to perform some sort of action. In any case, we will soon return to this issue,
when we discuss what I call knowing actions.
8. On this way of conceiving of knowledge-how, see Hetherington (e.g. 2008, 2011a, 2011b, 2015)
and Glick 2012.
9. That advice is from Peirce’s 1868 paper, ‘Some consequences of four incapacities’. An echo of
it, apparently, drives Wittgenstein’s (1958: para. 67) concept of family resemblance:“Why do we
call something a ‘number’? Well, perhaps because it has a – direct – relationship with several
things  that  have  hitherto  been  called  number;  and  this  can  be  said  to  give  it  an  indirect
relationship to other things we call the same name. And we extend our concept of number as in
spinning a thread we twist fibre on fibre. And the strength of the thread does not reside in the
fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the overlapping of many fibres.”
Importantly for this paper’s conception of knowledge, Wittgenstein continues thus:
“But if someone wished to say: ‘There is something common to all these constructions – namely
the disjunction of all their common properties’ – I should reply: Now you are only playing with
words.  One  might  as  well  say:  ‘Something  runs  through  the  whole  thread  –  namely  the
continuous overlapping of those fibres’.”
10. ‘But is  your calculating intended to convey knowledge? Or is  its  aim instead to reach the
knowledge?’  The  latter  could  be  parsed as  the  action’s  aiming  to  convey  the  agent  to  the
knowledge. I will not complicate my presentation with this detail.
11. ‘Yet how could one know that one has a persisting ability to perform such actions, if (as was
argued earlier) one cannot know introspectively of one’s having a persisting belief?’ I have noted
that abilities are in general not aspects of oneself that we would pre-theoretically expect to be
known introspectively. In contrast, people do expect to be able to access purely by introspection
at least many of their beliefs. (In my terms, though, that expectation misleads them. They self-
attribute a persisting belief when what they experience is at most an active manifestation of what
would be such a belief. Still, the expectation is present.) But an ability, by definition, is not like
that. We expect in general that an ability’s presence is known, if at all, not purely introspectively
at a given time. This is so, even for cognitive abilities.
12. Elsewhere (2011b), I have argued for a distinction between knowledge and knowing. But in
this paper I am not relying upon the details of that distinction.
13. I am not sure that Ryle himself saw this. He does say (1949: 134) that, when one knows that p,
one acts in related ways. He also says (ibid.: 135) that, for example, to say of someone“who keeps
to the edge, [that he does so] because he knows that the ice is thin, is to employ quite a different
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sense of ‘because’ […] from that conveyed by saying that he keeps to the edge because he believes
that the ice is thin.”
Could this ‘because’ in the person’s knowing be due to the actions being more an expression of the
knowledge than, say a mere consequence of it? Ryle does not say. Kremer (2017) portrays Ryle as
offering  a  picture  of  knowledge-that  and  knowledge-how  as  inter-related.  But  the  relations
described  by  Ryle  (and  by  Kremer  on  Ryle’s  behalf)  are  only  causal,  not  metaphysically
constitutive.  My  focus  is on  the  question  of  whether  there  are  metaphysically  constitutive
relations here that reveal at least part of what it is to know even a particular truth.
14. For this traditional conception of belief, see Cohen 1992, for example.
15. For discussion of Ryle on this issue, see Scheffler 1968, Myers-Schulz & Schwitzgebel 2013,
and Kremer 2017.
16. See Hetherington (2011a: ch. 1) on the many respects in which traditional epistemology has
side-stepped answering this implicit question. See Hetherington 2001 on the general idea of some
knowledge that p’s admitting of being better or worse – stronger or weaker – as knowledge that
p.
17. Is that state only ever of a person – and of nothing else in addition? For the idea of some
knowing being attributable not only to the person, but to the person plus some epistemically
pertinent factors, see Hetherington 2012.
18. See, for example, Sosa (2011, 2015, 2016) for statements of this approach. Reed (2016: 108)
accommodates it in this way: ‘even if knowledge is not itself an action, this is no bar to its being
action-like in important ways.’
19. And because it could be a potential grounded in the person as such (I have said nothing to the
contrary, at least), the potentialities model has the capacity to preserve what, for some, is an
insight that belongs with virtue-theoretic accounts of knowledge – the idea that the virtues in
question  are whole-person  rather  than  more  narrowly  cognitive.  That  idea  is  particularly
prominent within character-based forms of virtue epistemology, such as Zagzebski’s 1996. But it
is  also  part  of  Sosa’s  reliabilist  form  of  virtue  epistemology:  see  Reed  2016  for  an  elegant
explanation and expansion of its role within Sosa’s approach.
20. ‘How does a belief – which is a state, not an event, let alone an action – express or manifest
knowledge-how?’ From §2’s argument: what we find, when introspecting to ascertain what we
believe, are believings – actions or occurrences to which we may choose to apply the term ‘belief’
but whose continued life past our interacting with them we are not experiencing. They are, in
effect, themselves expressions or manifestations of belief.
21. An infallibilist would replace this ‘at least most’ with ‘all.’ My formulation is thus fallibilist.
For more on the nature and viability of knowledge-fallibilism, see Hetherington (1999, 2001, 2002,
2005, 2013, 2016b).
22. There  is  a  noteworthy  overlap  between  this  conception  of  the  truth  condition  within
knowledge,  and  Craig’s  1990  influential  view  of  our  concept  of  knowledge.  He  regards  that
concept as reflecting our needs for reliable informants – people upon whom we can rely as we seek
information. In Campbell’s sense, Craig’s approved informants are true, in that they are reliable
and faithful in what they convey to us.
23. God is at least aware of the tree. Does He ever really observe it? Apart from our having to use
a physical perceptual mechanism, we must await the tree’s presence before we can observe it.
Unlike  God,  we are  partly  dependent  on contingent  aspects  of  the  tree,  aspects  beyond our
making or our control. If that is perception, God does not perceive.
Knowledge as Potential for Action
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, IX-2 | 2017
18
ABSTRACTS
Can we conceive cogently of all knowledge – in particular, all knowledge of truths – as being
knowledge-how? This paper provides reasons for thinking not only that is this possible, but that
it  is  conceptually  advantageous  and  suggestive.  Those  reasons  include  adaptations  of,  and
responses to, some classic philosophical arguments and ideas, from Descartes, Hume, Peirce, Mill,
and Ryle. The paper’s position is thus a practicalism – a kind of pragmatism – about the nature of
knowledge, arguing that all knowledge is knowledge-how to act – to do this, to do that. Such a
conception can include, too, a distinctive view of the metaphysical relation between knowledge
and belief.  We see that, contrary to what most contemporary epistemologists say, knowledge
need  not  be  a  form  of  belief.  Instead, a  belief  that  p  can  be  a  way  simply  of  enriching  or
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